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Abstract: One puzzling feature of Plato’s Republic is the First City or ‘city of pigs’. 
Socrates praises the First City as a “true”, “healthy” city, yet Plato abandons it 
with little explanation. I argue that the problem is not a political failing, as most 
previous readings have proposed: the First City is a viable political arrangement, 
where one can live a deeply Socratic lifestyle. But the First City has a psycholog-
ical corollary, that the soul is simple rather than tripartite. Plato sees this ‘First 
Soul’ as an inaccurate model of moral psychology, and so rejects it, along with its 
political analogue.
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Introduction
Plato’s Republic is famous for describing in detail an idealized political arrange-
ment while using the same principles to provide a model of human psychology. 
Plato’s ideal city, Kallipolis, begins in a much simpler First City, which Glaucon 
quickly rejects as a “city of pigs” (372d4). This leads Socrates to replace it with 
what will eventually become Kallipolis. Most scholars have followed Glaucon in 
not taking the First City seriously. But Socrates says that the First City is a true, 
complete, just, and healthy city, and Plato never directly addresses why Socrates 
would be wrong in this assessment. This presents readers with an interpretive 
puzzle: why did Plato have Socrates praise the First City and then abandon it 
without any philosophical explanation of its faults?
In this paper I seek to answer this question. In section 1 I discuss the First 
City in detail, arguing that Socrates’s assessment of the First City is both sincere 
and accurate given Plato’s conception of justice in the Republic: the First City is 
a viable and just political arrangement. In section 2 I canvas contemporary treat-
ments of the First City. These views come in two groups. The first group fails to 
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account for the fact that the First City is a true, just city. The second gets this right 
but does not give an adequate explanation of the First City’s role in the overall 
context of the Republic. However, all these treatments help us see the desiderata 
which a successful account of the First City needs to satisfy; hence going carefully 
through these attempts will provide a better grasp of what a good explanation of 
the First City should look like. Finally, in section 3 I provide what I take to be a 
better explanation of the First City. I argue that the First City reflects a Socratic 
approach to moral psychology in which the soul is simple, a view that Plato took 
seriously and developed in his early dialogues. But Plato later came to replace this 
view with a new one positing a tripartite soul, which he expounds in the remain-
der of the Republic. As a political arrangement, there is nothing wrong with the 
First City: it represents an admirably Socratic lifestyle. But it would imply what 
Plato came to see as an inaccurate conception of the soul and, consequently, the 
collapse of the city/soul isomorphism on which the Republic rests. Hence Plato 
abandoned the simple First City and the corresponding simple Soul in favor of a 
tripartite city (Kallipolis) and a tripartite soul.1
1  The First City
Plato introduces the First City as part of a larger project attempting to show 
that that it is in one’s own interest to be just rather than unjust. This project is 
grounded in the idea that (i) there is an isomorphism between the city and the 
soul that allows conclusions on one side to apply to the other, and (ii) justice is 
shown to be the same thing in both cases (369a, cf. 441c–d). This proposed iso-
morphism shapes the discussion of justice throughout the Republic.
This discussion starts with Socrates arguing that cities come to be because 
no one is self-sufficient, and so each person must cooperate with others to meet 
each individual’s needs (369b). There are a few basic needs to which all humans 
are subject, namely food, shelter, and clothing (369d). When working with others 
to meet these needs, it is more efficient if each person specializes in a single task 
(370b). A city is, at bottom, is this system of interdependency (369c3–4).
1 The distinction between Socrates as character and Plato as author is always important and 
often easy to overlook or confuse. In what follows, I will use ‘Socrates’ to refer to the character of 
the platonic dialogues, particularly when referring to quotations from the text, and ‘Plato’ to refer 
to the author, particularly when referring to larger questions of design and authorial intent. Any 
answer to a ‘why?’ question about what Socrates says in the Republic is ultimately reducible to 
‘because Plato wrote it that way’. Thus, our real concern is the reasoning behind Plato’s choices.
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We will examine the details of the First City presently, but I want to begin by 
highlighting an unappreciated fact about it: the First City is a true, just city. Once 
the occupation of each of its citizens is settled, the First City is described as “com-
pleted” (Πλήρωμα, 371e7) and “finished” (τελέα, 371e10) and is likened to a well–
ordered city (ὀρθῶς οἰκουμέναις πόλεσι, 371c5–8).2 And after Glaucon objects to 
this claim on the grounds that the First City’s citizens live like pigs, Socrates draws 
a stark contrast between the First City, which he describes as a “true city” (ἀληθινὴ 
πόλις, 372e6) and as a “healthy one” (ὑγιής τις, 372e7; cf.  373b3), and the city 
which will become Kallipolis, which is a “luxurious city” (τρυφῶσαν πόλιν, 372e3) 
and a “feverish, festering city” (φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν, 372e8). Finally, as Socrates 
completes his description of Kallipolis in Book IV and questions what makes a city 
just, he argues that the relevant feature – that each does his or her own work – has 
been present since the founding of the First City (433a1–6, 443b7–c7).
But even if the text is clear about the fact that the First City is a true, com-
plete, and just city, we may still wonder what makes it so. ‘True’ and ‘complete’ 
here presumably have both descriptive and normative aspects such that a true, 
complete city does a good job at being whatever it is a city is. The bigger ques-
tion is what makes the First City a good city. To answer this question, we have to 
look more closely at both the First City and at Plato’s conception of the nature of 
justice. In short, a just city has three features: (i) it follows the Principle of Spe-
cialization, (ii) it is healthy, and (iii) it is internally stable. The First City, I argue, 
has all three of these features.
Let us begin with the Principle of Specialization, that each does one’s own 
work. This principle is introduced early in the discussion of the First City, at 
369e2–370c5, where Socrates remarks that people have more needs than they can 
satisfy alone, can work more efficiently on one job than on many, and have dif-
ferent aptitudes from one another. This principle is alluded to as a principle of 
justice at 371e12–372a2 but it is not fully expounded until Book IV where Socrates 
notes that
Justice, I think, is exactly what we said must be established throughout the city when we 
were founding it  – either that or some form of it. We stated, and often repeated, if you 
remember, that everyone must practice one of the occupations in the city for which he is 
naturally best suited. (433a1–6)
He goes on to conclude that “Then, it turns out that this doing one’s own work – 
provided that it comes to be in a certain way  – is justice” (433b35; cf.  433e12–
2 I use Reeve’s revision of Grube’s translation of the Republic throughout, with some modi-
fications.
434a1). For Kallipolis, the Principle of Specialization applies primarily at the class 
level: each of the three classes of the city – artisans, auxiliaries, and guardians – 
performs its role relative to the other two classes (434c7–10). But the First City 
does not have distinct classes; rather, the Principle of Specialization applies at 
the individual level, where each person performs their own occupation rather 
than trying to do more than one.
The second important feature of the justice of a person in the Republic is 
that it makes the soul healthy; indeed, on Plato’s view psychic health effectively 
is moral justice. In many ways, this is the most important idea in the Republic, 
for it provides the normative underpinning for Socrates’s response to Glaucon 
and Adeimantus (and Thrasymachus) that everyone would and should choose 
to be just rather than unjust. This argument is first suggested at the end of 
Book I where Socrates argues that justice is the virtue required for the soul to 
function well (352d–354a). Its most explicit formulation comes at the conclu-
sion of Book IV. Here Socrates argues that “just and unjust actions are no differ-
ent for the soul than healthy and unhealthy things are for the body” (444c5–6) 
because both health and justice are harmonious relationships between the 
component parts of the body and soul respectively (444d3–11). Socrates’s con-
clusion is that “Virtue seems, then, to be a kind of health, fine condition, and 
well-being of the soul, while vice is disease, shameful condition, and weakness” 
(444d13–e2).
As we have already seen, the First City is explicitly described as a healthy city 
(372e7, 373b3). But the health of the First City is not due to a relationship between 
its constituent classes, because there are no classes. Rather, each individual leads 
a healthy life and has a healthy relationship to other citizens. This is part of what 
Adeimantus means when he suggests that justice is to be found in the need that 
citizens have of one another (372a1–2). Everyone has a useful role to play in the 
city (371c5–8, 371e1–5), each person’s needs are met, and all live in peace with 
one another (372d2) without poverty or war (372c1).
The First City is also healthy in a more literal sense. It is notable that a 
physician is one of the first occupations listed in the First City (369d9). While 
the language here (τιν’ ἄλλον τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεραπευτήν) might at first 
seem non-committal, Socrates uses a similar phrase at 341c6–7 to pick out the 
person who is truly a doctor rather than a money-maker. Moreover, the uses of 
θεραπευτήν seem to refer to one who cares for the body through a preventative 
regimen rather than by treating unnatural diseases, that is, to one who accords 
with the Asclepiadic method of treatment discussed in detail and praised by 
Socrates at 403d–408c. This suggestion is corroborated by the lifestyle led by the 
inhabitants of the First City. Socrates is surprisingly specific about the kind of diet 
the First Citizens live on:
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For food, they’ll knead and cook the flour and meal they’ve made from wheat and barley. 
They’ll put their honest cakes and loaves on reeds or clean leaves, and, reclining on beds 
strewn with yew and myrtle, they’ll feast with their children, drink their wine, and, crowned 
with wreathes, hymn the gods … They’ll obviously need salt, olives, cheese, boiled roots, 
and vegetables of the sort they cook in the country. We’ll give them desserts, too, of course, 
consisting of figs, chickpeas, and beans, and they’ll roast myrtle and accords before the fire, 
drinking moderately. (372a6–d1)
The diet utilized by inhabitants of the First City is stereotypically moderate; it 
is regimented and simple but not austere.3 It is also suggested that they will 
engage in the moderate physical activities necessary for good health, especially 
when contrasted with the luxuries that are present in what we can call the Second 
City, the city composed of decadent citizens without rulers (373a–c). Hence it is 
no surprise that the description of the First City ends with the claim that its citi-
zens live a long, peaceful, and healthy life.4
The moderation of the First City naturally leads to the final important feature 
of justice: stability. This aspect of justice is only hinted at in the early books of the 
Republic, but it is developed more clearly in Book VIII where Socrates explains 
how timocracy emerges from aristocracy. While the devolutions to the lower 
constitutions seem rapid, the move from aristocracy to timocracy is less natural. 
We are told that “It is hard for a city composed in this way [i.  e. for Kallipolis] to 
change, but everything that comes into being must decay. Not even a constitution 
such as this will last forever” (546a1–3). While admitting that even aristocracy is 
a transient state, Socrates nevertheless implies that aristocracy is far more stable 
than other constitutions, because aristocracy is free of injustice, that is, of a kind 
of civil war between the parts of the city where one part tries to usurp the role of 
another (545c8–d3; cf. 351d4–352a8, 444b1–8).
The First City is also a stable city free of civil strife. As we’ve already seen, the 
inhabitants of the First City live in peace with one another. Because there are no 
classes in the First City, there will be no usurpation of one class’s role by another. 
The same would seem to apply at the individual level. Because each person is 
given a job for which they are well-suited (370a7–b2) and everyone has a role 
to play (371c5–e5), there is no incentive to try to take another person’s occupa-
3 For more on this issue see Davidson (1997), pp. 3–35, and especially the discussion of this pas-
sage at pp. 20–26. See also Mason (1995), Wilkins (1995), and Zoller (2015).
4 There is at least one sense in which the First City is actually healthier than Kallipolis. Kallip-
olis needs an educational regime to purge the Second City’s fever (399e5–8), while the First 
City is healthy from the start. Plato asserts that it is better to live a life not needing cures than 
to be cured of a disease, especially when that disease is caused by licentiousness (405c8–d4, 
cf. Grg. 478c).
tion. And even if they did, the repercussions would be much less drastic than in 
 Kalli polis, because it is easier to recover from one person failing to do their part 
than to recover from a constitutional change in the city. It is therefore no surprise 
that the description of the First City ends with the claim that “they’ll live in peace 
and good health, and when they die at a ripe old age, they’ll bequeath a similar 
life to their children” (372d1–3). While we shouldn’t think that the First City is 
immortal, it is notable that, in contrast to Socrates’s lengthy discussion about the 
stability of Kallipolis, we are not told of the mechanism by which the First City 
would break down.
The conclusion we should draw, then, is that Socrates is right to call the First 
City a true city by his standards. The First City is a just city, because it follows 
the Principle of Specialization, is healthy, and is internally stable. This raises an 
obvious interpretive puzzle: why does Plato have Socrates so quickly abandon the 
First City for what will become Kallipolis if it is a true, just city? Glaucon’s objec-
tions do not reveal any substantive flaws with the First City and Socrates is not 
the type to passively submit to questionable assumptions or faulty reasoning. So 
why did Plato write the dialogue so as to give us no answer here? I will supply an 
answer to this question in section 3. But before doing so, we must first discuss the 
various rival treatments of the First City. While I think that previous attempts to 
explain the First City’s role in the Republic have not succeeded, their efforts will 
reveal important aspects of the First City that will help us find a better answer.
2  Rival views
Though the First City is not discussed as often as many other topics in the Repub-
lic, it has not been totally ignored. I have organized previous treatment of the First 
City into two groups of three views each. The first group (sections 2.1–2.3) fails 
to accurately capture Plato’s description of the First City. But each of these three 
views has a counterpart in the second group (sections 2.4–2.6) that gets the First 
City right. The problems with the second group lie in situating the First City in 
the larger context of the Republic. But I think each view gets progressively closer 
to the truth, especially as we begin to focus on the moral psychology that corre-
sponds to Plato’s depiction of politics.
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2.1  The False Start View
We can call the first view on offer the False Start View. On this view, the First City 
has no clear role in the Republic at all. Plato begins with something like a state of 
nature, which is a common rhetorical device for political theory (cf. 358e–359b, 
Prt. 320c–323a, Aristotle’s Pol. 1252a–1253a), but the real philosophical work does 
not begin until Socrates starts discussing the luxurious city, and in particular the 
guardians that such a city requires.
This view is not often explicitly defended. However, the First City is also 
rarely discussed in any detail, and it is reasonable to suspect that many authors 
who do not find the First City worth discussing would subscribe to the False Start 
View. However, Julia Annas provides one explicit defense of this view:
The first city is allowed to develop, and becomes corrupt, in a very odd way, which forces 
us to ask what is the point of the first city in the Republic’s argument… The ideally just 
state … develops not from the first city but from the purging process that gets rid of what is 
unhealthy in the luxurious city… we have to conclude, though reluctantly, that Plato has not 
given the first city a clear place in the Republic’s moral argument. The real argument starts 
from fact about human nature and co-operation which we see at work in the luxurious city.5
To be fair, Annas reaches this conclusion by means of a kind of argument from 
elimination: what she takes to be the most plausible interpretation of the First City 
(discussed in section 2.2 below) doesn’t work, and so we’re left unable to explain 
it. To truly show that the False Start View is a non-starter, we need a successful 
positive account of the First City’s role in the Republic, which I will attempt in § 3.
But for now, we can note that there are reasons to resist the False Start View, 
even if our positive accounts fail. For one, we’ve seen that the First City is a true 
city. It is implausible that Plato would have described the First City as he did if he 
were not trying to make some point, notwithstanding our difficulty in discerning 
what that point was. More substantively, one of the reasons that the First City is 
a true city is that it exhibits the Principle of Specialization, which is so central to 
Plato’s conception of justice.6 Plato repeatedly refers back to the First City when 
he defines justice in Kallipolis in terms of the Principle of Specialization (374a4–
e3, 417a6–b5, 433a1–b5, 443b7–c7). This shows that Plato did not take the First 
City to be a false start, but rather as providing a crucial starting premise for his 
argument. But the question remains: what exactly is that argument?
5 Annas (1981), pp. 76–78.
6 Annas (1981), pp. 73–76.
2.2  The Progressive View
Perhaps the most common reading may be called the Progressive View.7 On this 
view, Plato introduces each city as an improvement on the previous one. Reeve 
summarizes the view as follows:
The three poleis might constitute an ordered series of good poleis each of which, when mod-
ified, is a component of its successor, only the third and final member of the series being 
itself a real possibility. And this suggestion, in turn, suggests another – namely, that the 
account of the Kallipolis incorporates such an ordered series of poleis as a way of explaining 
why the Kallipolis must have the elaborate structure it does, replete with philosopher-kings, 
guardians, and producers, if it is to be a real possibility.8
On this view, the First City is not to be entertained as a serious contender for 
the kind of city in which justice may be found; political justice requires a more 
complex civic arrangement. As Barney argues:
Now the First City very strikingly lacks any such rational control; instead, it is presented as 
spontaneously moderate and self-regulating. And this is just what the appetitive part, and 
the people dominated by it, can never be. It is true that the austere economic circumstances 
of the First City will be comparatively favourable to moderation. But even in the First City, 
we could not hope that the unnecessary and savage desires will simply fail to occur… Nuts 
and berries are no substitute for the rule of reason.9
In other words, on the Progressive View the First City couldn’t exist from which 
its proponents infer that it would be unable to tell us anything interesting about 
justice. The role of the First City is to demonstrate by its failure the need for 
rational political rule as exemplified by Kallipolis.
Like the False Start View, the Progressive View’s primary failing is that it does 
not take seriously the positive terms with which Plato has Socrates describe the 
First City. Plato describes it as a true city that peacefully exists from one gener-
ation to the next (372d1–3). This is because the First City is not composed of the 
kind of decadent citizens that compose the artisan class in Kallipolis. First City 
citizens eat and drink moderately, they have only the number of children they can 
support (and are therefore, apparently, sexually temperate), and they are careful 
to avoid poverty and war. The only passage which comes close to describing the 
7 Barney (2001), pp.  218–21. See also Nettleship (1922), pp.  67–76; Reeve (1998), pp.  170–77. 
Annas (1981), pp. 76–79, discusses this view but does not endorse it.
8 Reeve (1998), p. 171.
9 Barney (2001), pp. 219–20. Cf. Reeve (1998), p. 178.
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First City’s inhabitants as appetitive is where Socrates says that inhabitants of 
the First City will enjoy sex (ἡδέως συνόντες ἀλλήλοις), but even this remark is 
immediately followed by a comment on the moderation of this activity (372b8–9). 
The drive for unnecessary goods is not part of the First City but is rather intro-
duced against Socrates’s better judgment by Glaucon (372d–373d).
The Second City, on the other hand, contains decadent professions like 
“tutors, wet nurses, nannies, beauticians, barbers, chefs, cooks, and swineherds” 
(373b1–4), along with “all sorts of delicacies, perfumed oils, incense, prostitutes, 
and pastries…houses, clothes, and shoes… painting and embroidery… and gold, 
ivory, and the like” (373a2–8). Socrates complains that “[w]e didn’t need any of 
these in our earlier city, but we’ll need them in this one” (373c4–6).10 None of 
these are present in the First City. Hence the Progressive View errs in conflating 
the First City and its inhabitants with the luxurious Second City that follows. The 
First City is, in fact, described in more positive terms than the Second City.
Once the First City and Second City are properly distinguished, however, we 
might worry that the First City is not really a human city at all. If all humans do 
is meet their basic needs, they would essentially be living the life of animals, as 
Glaucon complained. But this approach underestimates the activities that citi-
zens perform in the First City.11 The First City is not a city of animals or of unnat-
ural ascetics; it includes sophisticated professions like architecture and sailing (a 
topic we will return to below).12 The First City has symposia and feasts of simple 
but not austere foods and wine. It might not contain the amount of comfort 
and culture that Glaucon wants, but according to Socrates it is an appropriate 
amount: it is certainly more comfortable than a life of bare subsistence. Glaucon 
thinks that the First City leaves something to be desired compared to the Second 
City, but Socrates does not seem to share that assessment.
10 The parallels with the Gorgias here are notable. See esp. 462c–464d.
11 Devereux (1979), pp. 36–37.
12 This point can be easily seen by comparing Socrates’s discussion of the First City with Pro-
tagoras’s discussion of the origin of man in his eponymous dialogue (Prot. 321c–323a; cf. States-
man 274c–e), where human existence is much more fraught than it is in the First City. A moral 
natural (though not perfect) parallel with the First City comes from Laws Book III, where Plato 
again depicts a civilization that is good in virtue of occupying the mean between poverty and 
opulence (see esp. 679a–e).
2.3  The Utopian View
This brings us to the last view in our first group, which I call the Utopian View. On 
this view, the First City is meant to hearken back to an idyllic, Hesiodic Golden 
Age. As Annas describes it,
Many have been naturally led to think that we are meant to take seriously the claim that 
the first city is the true one and the allusions to the Golden Age in the description of it. On 
this view, the first city is a picture of human association given an ideal picture of human 
nature – for in it only necessary human needs are met; and as long as this is the case, there 
will be no corruption. Plato, however, was aware that it is no good basing a political theory 
on the optimistic assumption that people will limit their demands to what they have natural 
and necessary needs for; they just won’t.13
The First City on this view is utopian in the derogative sense: it is a kind of city 
that cannot exist, because it is grounded in unrealistic assumptions about human 
nature.
There are two fairly straightforward objections to the Utopian View. First, 
Kallipolis is no more realistic than the First City. Plato frequently concedes that 
his ideal city might not be able to exist in reality (472c–473b, 592a–b). Moreo-
ver, the idea of a highly stratified caste systems where everyone is content to be 
ruled by philosophers, where guardians have no private property and no private 
relationships, where the masses have no political rights to speak of, and where 
mothers are forced to give up their children to the state, is, I should hope, no less 
credible than a small society where people are content with a moderate lifestyle. 
If the mere fact that the First City is unrealistic means that it can tell us nothing 
about justice, then the same should apply to Kallipolis.
Second, the Utopian View mischaracterizes life in the First City. The Progres-
sive View made the First City sound too harsh, but the Utopian View makes it 
sound much better than Socrates’s description of it. The First City is pleasant, 
but not idyllic. In particular, it does not correspond to Hesiod’s Golden Age: the 
First City inhabitants still have to work for their sustenance, e.  g. by laboring 
barefoot and naked in the summer.14 In fact, the entire foundation of the First 
City is a kind of division of labor grounded in scarcity and inefficiency, hardly 
ideal conditions. Moreover, the level of technical sophistication is much higher 
13 Annas (1981), p.  77. Cf. Barney (2001), p.  215; Devereux (1979), pp.  38–39; Nichols (1987), 
pp. 66–69.
14 The First City doesn’t correspond to any of Hesiod’s other ages either. Unlike the Silver Age, 
they worship the gods. Unlike the Bronze Age and Heroic Age, there is no war. Unlike the Iron 
Age, their lives are not full of toil and disagreement.
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than found in a Golden Age, with doctors, merchants, sailors, and craftsmen 
rather than only simple farmers or hunter-gatherers. The realism of the First City 
is easily seen when it is contrasted with the actually utopian past depicted in 
the Statesman, where people flourish without toil in a land of peace and plenty 
(271a–272e).15What we have in the First City is something less simplistic than we 
see in either the Progressive View or the Utopian View.
The Utopian View is therefore no place to start making sense of the First City. 
But proponents of the Utopian View can respond by reframing their critique as 
a philosophical rather than a textual one. Even if Plato presents the First City 
as a live possibility, he is wrong to do so because such a political arrangement 
would only work for creatures very different from human beings as we know 
them. In this case, we would read Glaucon’s remark about the First City being 
fit for pigs as reflecting Plato’s own more cynical views about human nature.16 
Hence Barney argues, “the [First] City is not a genuine possibility at all: for it 
embodies the hypothesis that a city without rational rule could be moderate in 
its appetites, and that hypothesis is false.”17 In fact, we can combine elements of 
the Progressive and Utopian Views to create a dilemma. If First City citizens are 
real humans, they will be disposed to want more than what is necessary and will 
therefore not be moderate without some external rule to prevent them from acting 
on their desires and, consequently, from disintegrating their city. But if the First 
City doesn’t need external rule because its citizens are not disposed to excess, it 
does not describe human nature accurately (since proponents of this view take 
humans to be, in reality, unable to moderate their appetites on their own), and is 
therefore irrelevant to a theory of justice.
We can slip through the horns of this dilemma by looking more closely at 
the activities of the First City’s inhabitants. Rather than as acting from desire for 
material goods or physical pleasure – as the artisan class of the Second City and 
Kallipolis does (and, later, as the oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical cities 
do) – the inhabitants of the First City are consistently described as acting from a 
calculation about what is to their practical benefit (369b5–c4, 370b10–c5, 371c5–
d3, 372b8–9, 372d1–3). In other words, though the terms are never used, the First 
City demonstrates good judgment (εὐβουλία) if not practical wisdom (φρόνησις). 
They do not have professional philosophers, to be sure, but this is not as much of a 
problem as it seems, for Book IV does not refer to professional philosophers either. 
Though Socrates goes on to argue that Kallipolis is only possible if it is run by 
15 See n. 62 below for more on the Republic/Stateman comparison.
16 Barney (2001), p. 216.
17 Barney (2001), p. 220. Cooper (2000), pp. 253–60 gives a similar reading.
philosophers, in Book IV the guardians are described throughout in terms of prac-
tical rather than theoretical wisdom (e.  g. 424e–427c, 428c–429a, 439c–442c).18 
For instance, the education that is proposed in Book IV is musical and athletic 
training (424b–c), i.  e. education which habituates the non-rational part of the 
soul, not philosophical education for the rational part. The wisdom of Kallipolis is 
explicitly described as good judgment (428b3–8, 428e10), which the inhabitants 
of the First City seem to possess. And there are at least hints of an educational 
regime in that citizens pass on their lifestyle to their children (372d2–4), and in 
the symposia and hymns to the gods (which are so important to education in the 
Kallipolis) are explicitly noted to include children (372b6–7).19
Moreover, we have reason to think that citizens of the First City do have 
a sense of justice rather than mere self-interest. It is true that cities exist in the 
first place because each person is not self-sufficient (369b7–9), and so need will 
compel people to live together on the grounds that “each believes that this is better 
for himself” (369c6–7).20 But Socrates also describes the citizens of the First City 
as “partners and helpers” (κοινωνούς τε καὶ βοηθούς, 369c3) and says that the 
reason why the city was founded was to be a partnership (κοινωνίαν) and to “share 
with one another” (ἀλλήλοις μεταδώσουσιν) goods and service that each provides 
(371b5–7). All this suggests that inhabitants of the First City have some conception 
of the connection between self-interest and the common good.21. Moreover, citi-
zens of the First City seem to have an admirable amount of self-knowledge vis-à-vis 
18 Cf. Ostwald (1971). I think Ostwald goes too far in conceiving as the city ruled by guardians 
and the city ruled by philosopher-kings as distinct constitutions, but he is right to note the appar-
ent lack of high-level Form-centered philosophy in the original description of Kallipolis.
19 Socrates does not say enough about the details of life in the First City to let us know to what ex-
tent the education of children goes beyond the family. But one interesting detail concerns vocation-
al training. Though Socrates says that inhabitants of the First City “bequeath a similar life to their 
children” (372d4), we are also told that each person will have a job for which they are naturally suit-
ed, given that people differ by nature (370a–b). This variation will undoubtedly occur even within a 
single family: Plato’s Myth of the Metals shows that he is aware of the likelihood of this even under 
a tightly controlled eugenic regime. The implication, then, is that, counter to the traditional model 
of children learning their parents’ craft within the family, in the First City, children are likely to be 
trained outside the home by practitioners of the craft who share the natural aptitude for it.
20 See Smith (1999), p.  40 for an argument that self-interest in the First City is conducive to 
justice, not in conflict with it.
21 Cooper (2000), p. 258 writes that “Justice requires not merely fair taking of turns, so to speak, 
but doing so with some countervailing motivation not to do it, or at least while recognizing that 
one might get something quite nice if one shirked.” But the First City is described in exactly these 
terms, when we are told that its citizens will “enjoy sex with one another, but bear no more chil-
dren than their resources allow, lest the fall into either poverty or war” (372b7–c2). Both desire for 
pleasure and awareness that they shouldn’t pursue it immoderately are shown in this description
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their own abilities and limitations, for they seem to spontaneously self-sort into 
the occupations they are naturally suited to, to find a job for everyone, and to live 
in a sustainable way that can be passed along through generations.22
Not only do citizens of the First City calculate what serves their interest, they 
also have a source of rational rule. There is not a separate political class in the 
First City, but there are experts in various sophisticated crafts, and these experts 
serve as rulers within their domain. So, for instance, a physician will be ruler 
when it comes to treating disease, a captain will rule when it comes to sailing, and 
so on, just as we are told in Book I (341c–342e, 345e–347e). So even if, contrary to 
the text, we think that all the residents of the First City are as disposed to excess 
as the residents of the Second City, they could still be kept in check by the experts, 
who would tell them, for example, ‘You’ll get sick if you eat too many acorns’, or 
‘You’ll run out of money for food if you spend it all on shoes in the market’. That 
Socrates thinks this a viable arrangement is shown by his repeated claim that 
the citizens of the First City are successful at pursuing their desires while also 
maintaining both their individual good and the common good (371a4–5, 371b5–7, 
372b7–c2, 372d2–4). There is no indication that they try to overstep their place or 
claim to know more about another person’s occupation.
Hence the worry is not that no one is in charge, but rather that the First City 
lacks a class of rulers who, because of the Principle of Specialization, engage in 
nothing but political rule. But it is a common theme outside the Republic that pol-
iticians do not understand the subject of their pursuits, while craftsmen do (cf. 
Ap. 21b–22a, Meno 92d–94e, Prt. 319a–320b). So, it would not be at all surprising 
if Plato thought that the citizens of the First City can all rule one another in a kind 
of technocracy where each person is in charge of the domain in which they are an 
expert. And we should remember that the guardians and philosopher-kings also 
do a variety of jobs; in particular, the philosophers are polymaths who variously 
serve in the army, study a variety of disciplines, and rule the city (535a–540b). 
If it is within the purview of a single occupation for philosophers to both study 
the Good and apply it politically, then it should also be within the purview of a 
single occupation to, say, treat the sick and also rule the city on matters of health. 
Irrespective of other questions about the connection between technical knowl-
edge and philosophy, the point here is simply that the Principle of Specialization 
allows for the same person to practice a discipline and to engage in political rule 
at the same time.
22 As an anonymous referee points out, this kind of self-awareness is suggestive of the kind 
of Socratic self-knowledge (i.  e. knowing what he knows and doesn’t know) that characterizes 
wisdom in the Apology. We will return to this topic in section 3.
All this shows that we can slip through the horns of the Utopian View’s 
dilemma. The citizens of the First City do not act excessively, but that does not 
entail that they have an unrealistic or inhuman moral psychology. Once we dis-
tinguish between the First City and the artisan class of the Second City, we can see 
that regulation of desire can be internal rather than external. Individual members 
of the First City can provide a conception of a particular good based on their 
expertise and serve as rulers on that topic. The rest of the city will be motivated by 
a sense of the common good to abide by that ruling and live moderately. The First 
City, where people live moderately and justly, is a city that operates in a rational 
way, even if it is not explicitly governed by philosopher-kings.23
This concludes the first group of explanations of the role of the First City in 
the Republic. The common theme in this group is that each view fails to take seri-
ously just how good the First City really is. When Plato has Socrates praise the 
First City as a true, healthy city, it appears to be sincere. We need to explain why 
Socrates is made to say this, not explain it away.
2.4  The Educational View
In what follows of section 2 we will look at three views that take Socrates at his 
word on this point. To this extent they represent an improvement over the first 
group. But, as I will argue, they each fail to get the second part of the puzzle right: 
given that the First City is a true city, why did Plato abandon the First City in favor 
of Kallipolis?
We can call the first of these interpretations the Educational View; it posits 
that Plato abandons the First City for pedagogical, not philosophical, reasons. 
Like the False Start View, the Educational View does not see a philosophical 
reason for abandoning the First City for Kallipolis. That is because, on this view, 
Socrates’s praise is taken to indicate that the First City is actually superior to 
Kallipolis.24 But because it is a better city, it makes a worse teaching tool, and so 
Plato switches to the Kallipolis model to teach the reader, represented in the dia-
logue by Glaucon, an important lesson about justice. Jonas, Nakazawa, & Braun, 
representatives of the Educational View, write:
23 We will have more to say about the place of reason and philosophy in the First City in section 
3 below.
24 Jonas, Nakazawa, & Braun (2012), pp. 356–57.
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The reason for discovering justice in a city is ultimately to discover justice in the soul. … 
Unfortunately, after the interlocutors construct a city that, as we shall argue, Socrates 
takes to embody justice (the First City), Glaucon is unable to see the justice of that city and 
demands a different type of city, namely a luxurious one with a fever. Consequently, in order 
for Socrates to fulfill his goal of the dialogue he must provide an image that better assists 
Glaucon in seeing justice. The image that ultimately achieves this goal is the Kallipolis. It is 
therefore consistent for Socrates to maintain that the First City is the true and healthy one, 
and nevertheless go on to construct a new city.25
There are two ways in which the First City is pedagogically deficient: it does not 
provide a clear illustration of injustice, and it is convincing only to those already 
disposed to value justice properly.26
Despite the progress it makes in evaluating the First City, the Educational 
View is not without its shortcomings, in particular about the role of Kallipolis. 
The main problem I see in the Educational View has to do with its analysis of the 
pedagogical role of Kallipolis. This reading alleges that the First City cannot be 
used to illustrate injustice, because there is no injustice to be found in it. Hence 
Plato constructs an inferior city, one which can be unjust, in order to show what 
injustice would look like, and therefore why justice is better than injustice. This is 
a very common observation in discussion of the First City; even views which eval-
uate the First City differently have made much of Socrates’ concession to Glaucon 
that we may see the growth of both justice and injustice in the feverish Second 
City.27
However, I think that this way of looking at the First City cannot possibly be 
right. As a purely textual matter, Socrates does concede to Glaucon that looking 
at a luxurious city “may not be a bad idea, for by examining it, we might very well 
see how justice and injustice grow up in cities.” (372e3–6). But he says nearly the 
exact same thing to Adeimantus early, asking “where are justice and injustice to 
be found” in the First City (371e12). And when Socrates embarks on his discussion 
of the First City, immediately after noting the isomorphism between city and soul, 
he asks “[i]f we could watch a city coming to be in theory, wouldn’t we also see its 
justice coming to be, and its injustice as well?” (369a6–8).
Socrates’s claims notwithstanding, one might object that the First City cannot 
be used as a model for injustice since the resources needed to explain injustice 
are not available. But we need to distinguish the question of whether injustice is 
25 Jonas, Nakazawa, & Braun (2012), p. 336.
26 Jonas, Nakazawa, & Braun (2012), pp. 337–38
27 Annas (1981), p.  78; Barney (2001), pp.  214–15; Cooper (2000), p.  258; Deslauriers (2001), 
pp. 230–31; Devereux (1979), pp. 37–38; Jonas, Nakawaza & Braun (2012), pp. 336–37.
present in the First City from the question of whether we can learn about injustice 
from the First City. And the answer to the second question is, I think, ‘yes’. As we 
saw in section 1, there are three properties that make a city just: specialization, 
moderation, and stability. Consequently, an unjust city will be one which fails to 
exemplify these properties. Plato may not have gone into the details to show what 
would make the First City become unjust, or what unjust citizens of such a city 
would be like, but he has given us the tools we need to make a straightforward 
inference based on his description of justice.
Moreover, the Educational View argues that the specific lesson Glaucon needs 
to learn is about the interdependence between moderation and justice.28 But it is 
especially odd to think that the First City cannot be used to teach this lesson since 
moderation is its most notable feature. In fact, the First City looks much more 
moderate than Kallipolis due to the absence of unnecessary luxuries in the First 
City. Kallipolis is said to be purged of luxuries at 399e4–5 (cf. 416c–417b), but the 
context requires only that the Guardians do not partake of these luxuries, and it 
is unclear whether the same holds of the artisan class.29 Even if we grant that the 
luxuries Glaucon insisted on are eventually removed from Kallipolis altogether 
(as 420e–422a perhaps suggests), it does not follow that Kallipolis is a better 
model of moderation. For, as we are told, it is better to live a healthy life than to 
be cured of disease (405c8–d4). The First City therefore looks better on this score 
than Kallipolis.
So even though the Educational View is correct about the quality of the First 
City, it does not successfully resolve the mystery of why Plato abandons it in favor 
of Kallipolis. But the failure of the Educational View does show us something 
important: the First City cannot be rejected on the grounds that it is too simple or 
too naïve to teach us about both justice and injustice. Plato must have had a more 
substantive reason to move from the First City to Kallipolis.
2.5  The Contingency View
The next view to consider, which we can call the Contingency View, holds that 
the First City is a true, complete, just city because it is unified, and in fact more 
unified that any city other than Kallipolis.30 This is because the appetites of the 
city’s inhabitants are moderated by calculations of self-interest that show that 
28 Jonas, Nakazawa, & Braun (2012), pp. 337–42.
29 Cf. Peterson (2011), pp. 109–15.
30 McKeen (2004).
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cooperation is necessary if they are to survive and thrive. The problem is that the 
unity of the First City is contingent:
The unity in the [First City], I suggest, is contingent in the way that happiness is contingent 
for the person who is only instrumentally virtuous. For [the First City], unity is secured as 
long as, in general, acting in one’s self interest conduces to acting in the interest of the 
community.
But citizens of the [First City] do not value civic unity, justice, or even the polis itself, for its 
own sake. Amicability among its citizens is valuable to residents of [the First City] insofar 
[as] it provides the benefits they enjoy…But things might go differently. Circumstances may 
change and individual interests might thereby diverge. If this happens, there is nothing that 
will secure the unity of the [First City] against these contingencies.31
On this view, the goodness of the First City is due to luck rather than the intrinsic 
nature of the city’s arrangement or its citizens. A change in circumstance could 
easily disrupt the First City’s unity, and this is a problem because
Unity in the [First City] depends overly on lucky circumstances which allow individual 
self-interests to coincide. But there is no mechanism in the [First City] to guard against 
changing fortunes, accidents and circumstances which would leave individual interests to 
diverge. To the extent that the [First City] depends on luck, it is unstable and insufficiently 
unified, and thus, is inferior to kallipolis.32
The unity of Kallipolis, by contrast, is resistant to these contingencies. This 
explains why Plato would prefer Kallipolis but still have Socrates praise the First 
City.
There are two remarks to be made against the Contingency View. First, it sells 
short exactly how unified the First City actually is. As I argued in section 1, the 
First City is a stable city. This is true both synchronically (citizens live at peace 
with one another) and diachronically (citizens pass on their lifestyle to their 
children). And as I argued in section 2.3 above, inhabitants of the First City have 
a sense of justice based on the needs of others. There is nothing in the text to 
suggest that the First City would fall apart in different circumstances or be any 
more threatened by external changes than Kallipolis would.
Second, the Contingency View owes us an explanation of the mechanism by 
which the First City’s unity would be lost and it is hard to see how this expla-
nation could work. Socrates goes into considerable detail about how Kallipolis 
would degenerate through stages into eventual tyranny. There are two closely 
31 McKeen (2004), p. 90. Note that McKeen refers to the First City as either ‘Swillsburg’ or ‘huop-
olis’; I have replaced these terms with ‘First City’ to keep the discussion consistent.
32 Mckeen (2004), p. 71.
related causes of this devolution. One is “lack of likeness and unharmonious ine-
quality” within and between political classes (547a3–4) and the other is wanting 
more than what is necessary, in particular more wealth and pleasure (547b–548c). 
These two causes result in the wrong people being in charge (e.  g. money-makers 
rather than philosophers).
The First City, on the other hand, looks tailor-made to resist these problems. 
There are no political classes and so no worries that people will be put in the 
wrong class or that members of one class will meddle with the work of other 
classes. And, as we’ve seen, citizens of the First City are better at living moder-
ately than the artisan class. The only excess profit from work mentioned in the 
discussion of the First City is stipulated to be used for trading (370e9–371a5) and 
currency is only mentioned as a necessity for the exchange of goods and services 
(371b4–10).33 There is no hint of public offices in the First City which could tempt 
citizens to pursue the unearned public honor that corrupts lesser constitutions. 
Moreover, because the First City is a much smaller, more interconnected city of 
craftsmen, its inhabitants will be able to see the connection between their own 
good and the good of the city much more easily than the citizens of Kallipolis 
can. Given these facts, there is no indication that the inhabitants of the First City 
would abandon justice for their own self-interest. This doesn’t mean that the First 
City could exist forever, any more than Kallipolis could; but it does appear to be 
more unified and more stable than Kallipolis.34
The Contingency View, then, fails to adequately explain what problem Plato 
must have seen in the First City. However, we are getting progressively closer to 
the truth. Though the specific way the Contingency View approaches the topic 
does not quite work, the unity of the First City is an important feature to consider. 
There is one more rival view left to address, one which also deals with the unity 
of the First City.
2.6  The Unity View
Our final attempt at explaining the role of the First City can be called the Unity 
View. Like the Educational View and the Contingency View, the Unity View 
accepts that the First City is a true, just city. It agrees with the Educational View 
33 It is perhaps significant that the word used here is σύμβολον, which suggests a token with 
little instrumental value rather than gold or silver, which is only introduced in the feverish Sec-
ond City (373a7–8).
34 Smith (1999), pp. 40–41.
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that the First City is better than Kallipolis while agreeing with the Contingency 
View that what makes a city good is its unity. The clearest explication of this view 
is probably from Don Morrison:
The interpretation I propose is even more favorable to Socrates’s first city. On this reading, 
the city of pigs is perhaps as stable as Callipolis, but even more unified and better than 
Callipolis. Socrates’ initial choice, his praise of the first city as “true” and “healthy” and his 
denigration of the second city that becomes Callipolis as “luxurious,” receive a straightfor-
ward explanation: the city of pigs is the Republic’s ultimate utopia, its best city. Callipolis, 
though better than any existing city, ranks second.35
On this view, the puzzle that motivates the present paper is dissolved: there is 
no mystery as to why Plato would have Socrates praise the First City but then 
abandon it: it wasn’t abandoned at all. The First City and Kallipolis are comple-
mentary parts of a single, continuous theory.
This approach to the First City is an ingenious way of making sense of the way 
Socrates praises it but then provides a new view as a result of Glaucon’s prompt-
ing. On this view it is Glaucon who represents the true city of pigs, not Socrates 
and his First City. But unfortunately, I don’t think this view can be right either. 
Whatever we think about the realizability of Kallipolis compared to the First City, 
it is clear from the text that Plato did not think of Kallipolis as only second best.
There are a number of examples where we see Plato describing Kallipolis in 
even better terms than the First City. Transitioning from discussing the city to the 
soul, Socrates says that “we have founded the best city we were able to” (434e1–
2), and later calls it “good and correct” (449a1–2). In arguing that Kallipolis is 
possible he claims that it is the city closest to the theoretical ideal (473a5–8). The 
summary of Kallipolis that precedes the discussion of defective constitutions in 
Book VIII says that a city which intends to reach the pinnacle (ἄκρως) of govern-
ance must be organized like Kallipolis, in particular by being ruled by philos-
ophers-kings (543a1–6). The discussion of constitutions culminates with Glau-
con’s verdict that Kallipolis is “the best, most just, and happiest” city in virtue of 
its being the “most kingly” (580c1–2). The First City, on the other hand, is never 
described in comparative or superlative terms: it is true, healthy, and just, but not 
necessarily best.
Glaucon’s verdict reveals a second important point about how Plato thinks 
about Kallipolis. His evaluation is explicitly restricted to five constitutions: aris-
35 Morrison (2007), p.  252. Rowe (2007a), pp.  180–84 gives a very similar argument, though 
from a different angle (to which I will return below); see also Rowe (2007b), pp. 43–44. De Lara 
(2018) is a more recent attempt to defend a similar position.
tocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny (580b3; cf. 445d2, 449a2–
5, 544a1–3). The First City, whatever its virtues, is not located on the same scale 
as these other options. This is because, as I argued above, the First City does not 
correspond simply to the artisan class, but is rather a distinct way of thinking of 
political classes. The other five constitutions, on the other hand, are all evaluated 
by how the same three classes relate to one another.36 Since the First City doesn’t 
line up neatly on this scale, it is misleading to suggest that Plato thought that the 
First City was not only part of this list, but at the top.
This disanalogy between the First City and the five tripartite constitutions 
reveals another problem with the Unity View, stemming from the view’s expli-
cation of goodness in terms of unity. There are, broadly speaking, two ways of 
being unified: simplicity and harmony. A simple constitution, like the First City, 
is one where there is only one political class. which is unified because there is 
no other political class to cause internal conflict. This is not the way Kallipolis 
is unified; instead, Kallipolis’s unity comes from a harmony between its three 
classes (430e–432a, 551d–e).37 So while it is true that Kallipolis is the best con-
stitution due to its unity, it is unified in a different way than the First City and, 
consequently, not directly comparable. In fact, simplicity can sometimes be a 
sign of badness in constitutions: one aspect of both democracy (557a, 560b–d) 
and tyranny (565e–566a, 567a–c) is that leaders expel their political opponents, 
i.  e. the people who ought to be leading the city. To the extent that there are no 
guardians or auxiliaries in these constitutions, these cities are simpler but not 
better. Indeed, the fact that the First City and Kallipolis are good in different ways 
makes a ‘better’ or ‘best’ comparison between the two unhelpful; each should be 
evaluated on its own scale.
Therefore, I do not think that the Unity View succeeds in situating the First 
City in its broader context. But there is another way of defending the Unity View 
which merits discussion on its own terms. So far, we have focused almost exclu-
sively on the First City as a political arrangement. But because city and soul are 
isomorphic in the Republic, we can take a more indirect route to defend the First 
City by thinking about the soul instead. Hence Rowe argues
36 Plato does mention the possibility of other constitutions (544c7–d3), but it is clear that he 
thinks of these as further permutations of how the three classes are structured and how they 
relate to one another (cf. 445d4–e2).
37 See Brown (2012), and from a different vantage point, Korsgaard (2009), Ch 7.
The First City and First Soul in Plato’s Republic   69
70   Jerry Green
Socrates’s preference, I take it, would be for a city of men and women each of whom would 
have a soul configured as much like soul ‘in its truest nature’ as possible. And that, I 
propose, is what the city which Glaucon dismisses as ‘fit for pigs’ would be; that is why 
Socrates is able to call it a ‘true’, ‘healthy’ city (372e6). The idea comes and is gone again 
so swiftly that interpreters tend either to ignore it or dismiss it… even while being, from 
Socrates’ perspective, what a city truly is, just as the undivided soul represents what a 
human soul truly (is in its true[st] nature).38
The idea that the human soul is truly undivided, not tripartite as Books II–IV and 
VIII–IX would have us believe, is grounded in a discussion that takes place near 
the end of the Republic, in Book X. There Socrates tells Glaucon
But to see the soul as it is in truth, we must not study it as it is while it is maimed by its 
association with the body and other evils – which is what we were doing earlier – but as 
it is in its pure state, that’s how we should study the soul, thoroughly and by means of 
logical reasoning. We’ll then find that it is a much finer thing that we thought and that we 
can see justice and injustice as well as all the other things we’ve discussed far more clearly. 
(611b9–c4)
This passage looks like Plato is complicating the tripartite model he had used 
in Books II–IX, suggesting that the true nature of the soul might be different.39 
Indeed, a few lines later Socrates says that if we studied the soul in this way,
Then we’d see what its true nature is and be able to determine whether it has many parts or 
just one and whether or in what manner it is put together. But we’ve already given a decent 
amount, I think, of what its condition is and what parts it has when it is immersed in human 
life. (612a3–6)
This passage suggests that the soul itself, in its true nature, might be simple rather 
than partitioned. In the same way that the simple First City is a true city but can 
be modified by grafting on the pursuit of unnecessary pleasures, the true nature 
of the soul might be simple but modified by grafting on unnecessary appetites 
arising from physical embodiment. If this is right, then the First City would be the 
best political arrangement after all, better than Kallipolis, because the First City 
would correspond to the ideal state of the soul.
A full response to this reading of the Republic is a larger endeavor than I can 
undertake here; it would require a close look at, inter alia, the language Plato 
38 Rowe (2007a), p. 180.
39 M. Anagnostopoulos (2006), pp.  176–78. Guthrie (1971), Whiting (2012) and Woolf (2012) 
argue for this view of the soul in the Republic, but do not connect it to the First City. Smith (1999) 
argues that the Republic is not committed to either the simple or tripartite model but does suggest 
that the First City could correspond to a simple soul consistent with the Book X discussion.
uses in talking about the parts of the soul and the precise workings of akrasia.40 
For now I will only mention two reasons to hesitate adopting this reading; both 
undermine the likelihood that Book X supports a simple soul view.
First, the passage I’ve quoted above from Book X is less conclusive than it 
might appear at first reading. Above I gave only the beginning and end of the 
passage. In the middle are two claims that count against taking Plato to endorse 
a simple soul in this part of the Republic. First, Plato likens the embodied soul 
to the sea god Glaucus, who is covered by detritus such that his body cannot be 
seen. In particular, some of “the original parts of his body” (τά τε παλαιὰ τοῦ 
σώματος μέρη) have fallen off and others have been added (611c6–d12). The soul, 
we are told, is in a similar condition (611d5). This comparison implies that the 
original soul in this metaphor would also have parts, just like Glaucus’s body 
does. If that is right, then the most natural reading is that the true soul in this 
passage would be structured like Kallipolis, while the soul beset by evil (611d6) 
would be like the tyranny that has expelled the philosophers and replaced them 
with drones. That is, the original soul would be complex, not simple, and hence 
would not correspond to the First City after all. Rather, the soul underneath the 
‘detritus of the body’ would still be a partitioned soul, presumably one that corre-
sponds to the tripartite model Plato has been defending all along.
The second claim is that the soul’s true nature is revealed by examining its 
love of wisdom, whereby we learn that the soul is “akin to the divine (συγγενὴς 
οὖσα τῷ τε θείῳ) and immortal and what always is (ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τῷ ἀεὶ ὄντι)” 
(611e1–2). It is easy to see how this description applies to the rational part of the 
soul as depicted in Books V–VII, and we might infer that it is the only true part 
of the soul.41 But to connect this back to the realm of the political, (i) philos-
opher-kings cannot survive on their own since they are forbidden from doing 
the manual labor necessary for them to survive and because one cannot be a 
ruling class without having another class to rule; and, more importantly, (ii) the 
First City is a much more down-to-earth city than this elevated description of an 
immortal soul, firmly grounded in meeting the needs of the body, which is no sur-
prise given that the simple soul corresponding to the First City would be embod-
ied just like the tripartite soul corresponding to Kallipolis. The first point suggests 
that the rational part of the soul is both physically and conceptually connected 
40 Bobonich (2002), Chs. 3–4 and Lorenz (2006a), Chs. 1–4 both defend the traditional tripartite 
reading of Plato in considerable detail. See also Irwin (1995), Ch. 13. See Brown (2012), pp. 56–62, 
Woolf (2012), pp. 155–57, Shields (2011), p. 156 n. 24, and Whiting (2012), pp. 176–90 for a dis-
cussion of Plato’s diction about the parts of the soul, and Shields (2011), pp. 146–47 on ways of 
thinking about parts.
41 As Guthrie (1971) does. See Reeve (2013) for a more extended defense of this reading.
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to the rest of the soul. The second point suggests that, even if Plato had a simple, 
separable soul in mind in Book X, it is not one that corresponds to the First City 
because the simple soul corresponding to the First City would be much more than 
just intellect.42
A look at the context of the Glaucus passage reveals another problem with 
the view that Plato is endorsing a simple soul in Book X. Plato’s goal here is to 
argue that the soul is immortal. If the soul were simple, we would expect Plato 
to use an argument similar to the one he deploys in the Phaedo.43 Conversely, he 
could take the immortality of the soul as a premise to show that the soul must be 
simple, in roughly the same way that the Phaedo takes the theory of recollection 
as a premise to argue that the soul is immortal.44 But this is very conspicuously 
not what Plato does. Instead, he provides a different argument for the immortality 
of the soul (608e–611a), one arguing that, because the soul lacks the natural evils 
that are a necessary condition of destruction, the soul cannot be destroyed. This 
argument holds regardless of how many parts the soul has, and this seems to be 
the whole point of making it. If Plato wanted to argue for a simple soul in Book 
X, we would expect him to use an immortality argument that entails that the soul 
is simple.45 Rather than simply contradicting the Phaedo’s position that only 
simple things are eternal, Book X appears to be consciously searching for a new 
way to secure this conclusion that is consistent with the composite psychology of 
the Republic’s preceding books.46
However, Plato has Socrates go to say that we should not think that “the 
soul in its truest nature is full of multicolored variety and unlikeness or that it 
differs with itself” (611b1–3). He explains this remark by saying that “it isn’t easy 
for anything composed of many parts (σύνθετόν τε ἐκ πολλῶν) to be immortal 
if it isn’t put together in the finest way, yet this is how the soul now appeared to 
us” (611b5–7). But Plato’s tripartite soul is put together in the finest way, which is 
what I take the final clause of the sentence to be saying and certainly what Plato’s 
42 Bobonich (2002), pp. 255–56; Lorenz (2006a), p. 38.
43 Indeed, Rowe (2007a), p. 167 takes Republic X to endorse the view of the soul given in the 
Phaedo. See also Whiting (2012), pp. 207–208.
44 If the Republic were written after the Phaedo, Plato could simply adopt this argument directly 
(much like how the Pheado borrows explicitly from the Meno). But the point stands even if the 
Phaedo is contemporary with, or later than, the Republic: the main point here is the assumptions 
and implications of the Book X argument vis-à-vis a complex soul, not the relationship between 
the Republic and the Phaedo. See n. 62 below for more on this point.
45 Lorenz (2006a), pp. 36–38 gives a similar reading.
46 See Brown (1997) for a reconstruction and defense of Plato’s argument that does not rely on 
the soul’s metaphysical simplicity.
discussion of the just soul in the preceding Books suggests.47 At least in the just 
soul (i.  e. the soul that exhibits its true nature through its natural goodness) the 
parts of the soul are in harmony with one another. So this argument does not rule 
out the possibility that a tripartite soul could be immortal.48 Plato’s agnosticism 
at the end of the passage about whether the soul has one part or many reflects 
this fact: if Plato took his argument to rule out a composite soul, he could have 
said so while maintaining a need to investigate the true nature of the soul more 
philosophically.49 We should read Plato’s hesitation here not as taking back his 
view in preceding chapters, but rather as the standard non-dogmatic approach 
that he often exhibits when discussing the eternal, including not just the soul but 
also the Forms and the gods.
All this suggests that Plato does not clearly endorse a simple soul in Book 
X, and that he would not be committed to endorsing the First City as superior 
to Kallipolis if he had done so. The First City and Kallipolis are incomparable 
since they are unified in different ways. Even so, I think the Unity View makes 
an important methodological advance over the other views we have discussed. 
Focusing on the soul in addition to the city is, I believe, the key to explaining 
the First City’s mysterious role. And the insight that the First City implies a corre-
sponding simple soul is an important piece of the puzzle. In the final section of 
this paper, I will argue for how I think this puzzle can be solved.
3  The First Soul
Our investigation of the First City was prompted by the incongruity between 
Socrates’s praise of the city and its rapid replacement by what would become 
Kallipolis. We have surveyed several views that I think do not solve this puzzle. 
This survey does more than just eliminate the competition: it shows what a suc-
cessful explanation of the First City’s role in the Republic must look like. Sections 
2.1–2.3 show us that Plato’s description of the First City as a true, healthy, just 
city along with his description of live in the First City must be taken seriously. 
In particular, we should note the relative professional and moral sophistication 
47 The Greek is ambiguous between ‘it now appeared to us to be finely put together’ and ‘it now 
appeared to us to be immortal’. But I think it is slightly more natural to take the ὡς to refer to the 
closer possible antecedent, which favors the former reading over the latter.
48 As Woolf (2012), p. 162 notes in discussing the passage. See also Lorenz (2006a), pp. 161–62. 
Lorenz (2006b), pp. 38–39 argues that the Timaeus settles the issue that is left open in Republic X.
49 Price (1995), pp. 73–74.
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exhibited by the First City’s citizens. Section 2.4 shows us the dangers of going 
too far in attending to the details of the First City at the expense of Kallipolis. 
Section 2.5 shows us that the First City is stable in a non-contingent way because 
of its simplicity and moderation. This in turn shows us that there are two ways 
for a city to be unified, which undercuts the approach discussed in section 2.6 
stating that the First City is better than Kallipolis. Section 2.6 also suggests that 
we get closer to the right answer when we focus on the soul in addition to the 
city. In this section I will follow through on this suggestion. I argue that the First 
City is a viable political arrangement although it implies an inaccurate model of 
the soul. In other words, the grounds on which Plato abandons the First City are 
psychological, not political.
As we saw in section 1, the First City is a true, just, healthy city. The upshot of 
this claim is that the First City is a viable political arrangement. Hence whatever 
problem Plato saw in the First City would not have been a political problem. And 
if the problem isn’t political, perhaps it is a matter of psychology instead. Why? 
Well, a central premise of the Republic’s argument is that civic justice and psychic 
justice are similar states; hence we can learn about what justice is for individuals 
by looking at the easier case of justice in the state (368c–369a). This prompts us to 
ask what the soul that corresponds to the First City would look like, a ‘First Soul’. 
Since Plato has Glaucon goad Socrates into focusing on what becomes Kallipolis 
instead, we never get a description or a model of the soul that would correspond 
to the First City. The most important point for our purposes is that the First Soul 
would be simple, like the First City, and, consequently, without the tripartite 
division of appetite, spirit, and reason found in the soul which corresponds to 
 Kallipolis.
One might worry whether this arrangement is even possible in Plato’s view. 
After all, if justice in Kallipolis and the tripartite soul are both relational, how 
could the First City or First Soul be just? Or, coming from the other direction, how 
could any just entity fail to be composite?
To answer this question, we need to distinguish two different ways of think-
ing about how the city and soul are related in the Republic. Though these terms 
are sometimes used interchangeably, let us stipulate that analogy and isomor-
phism are distinct relationships. The city and soul are analogous if they are just in 
the same way, i.  e. by following the Principle of Specialization. The city and soul 
are isomorphic if they have the same internal structure. Kallipolis and the tri-
partite soul are isomorphic with each other, both having three parts with similar 
functions. The First City and simple soul are isomorphic with each other but they 
are not isomorphic with Kallipolis or the tripartite soul.
What is interesting, and perhaps surprising, is that analogy doesn’t entail 
isomorphism on Plato’s view, as evidenced by the fact that the First City and 
Kallipolis are both just by following the Principle of Specialization, but they are 
not isomorphic.50 So, at least in principle, a simple soul and a tripartite soul 
could also be analogous by both being just in virtue of following the Principle 
of Specialization. And it should be remembered, as we saw above, that, when 
Socrates explains the discovery of justice in the First City and points back to it 
in his discussion of justice in Kallipolis, it is the Principle of Specialization to 
which he points. Moreover, Socrates seems to take the Principle of Specialization 
to be a sufficient tool for discovering justice in the First City. The larger/smaller 
letter imagery, which begins the inquiry (368c–369a), relies only on analogy, and 
Socrates’s assessment of the First City as complete (let alone the true, healthy, 
and just) never mentions the city’s simple structure. It is only at Glaucon’s urging 
that Socrates introduces parts into the city.
One might think that, once parts are introduced into the city, Plato could 
take for granted that the soul exhibits the same structure. Indeed, it is a common 
refrain that Plato introduced an unmotivated partition of the city in order to rely 
on it when explaining the soul. But Plato does not take the tripartition of the soul 
for granted in Book IV Instead, he first notes that the isomorphism of city and 
soul is not guaranteed (434d–e), then goes to great lengths to prove that the soul 
has three parts using a new argument from opposition (435a–441c) not applied 
to the city. It is only after securing this result independently that he applies his 
analysis of the city’s virtues to the soul (441c–444e).
What this tells us, I suggest, is that Plato did in fact think that the soul must 
be partitioned. But he did not think the same of the city, and for good reason: 
small cities can exist without political classes. In other words, the key difference 
between the city and soul is empirical: a simple city is a viable model of the city 
and therefore useful for discussing justice, while the simple soul is not a viable 
model of the soul, but rather one which must be rejected on its own terms.
Now, why would Plato think this? As commentators have long noted, Plato 
comes to see that a simple model of the soul is insufficient to explain the complex-
ities of human moral psychology.51 Plato therefore posits a more complex model, 
one where the soul has parts that can conflict with themselves rather than just 
with the body. But given isomorphism, a complex soul would imply a complex 
city rather than the simple First City, hence the theoretical need for Kallipolis.
50 Smith (1999) makes a similar case, using the label “3–3 specification” to refer specifically to 
a tripartite isomorphism.
51 Bobonich (2002), pp. 219–47; Brickhouse and Smith (1994), pp. 92–97; Lesses (1987); Klosko 
(2006), pp. 71–77; Lorenz (2006a), pp. 28–34; Mille (1999), pp. 90–100; Price (1995), pp. 33–57; 
Vasiliou (2012), pp. 26–30.
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We can tell that Plato is concerned about getting the right model of moral 
psychology in addition to the right political model by the way he writes the tran-
sition from politics to ethics in Book IV. If he were taking for granted the city/
soul isomorphism he could move directly from discussing the city to discussing 
the soul. But instead, we are told that this conclusion “is not yet wholly secure” 
(434d2), followed by an explicit discussion of why we shouldn’t infer the nature 
of the soul immediately (434d–435d). Plato goes to some length to give an inde-
pendent argument to show that the soul is tripartite in a way that corresponds to 
Kallipolis (435e–444e). If he were simply assuming that a political model entails 
a psychological model, these arguments would be unnecessary. A second piece of 
evidence is Plato’s discussion of the soul’s immortality in Book X. As I argued in 
section 2.6, Plato comes up with an argument for the immortality of the soul that 
is compatible with a complex soul rather than applying only to simple souls as 
his argument from the Phaedo does. If the Book X argument supported a simple 
soul, we would expect an argument for the immortality of the soul to take account 
of that fact, as is the case elsewhere, but this is not what we see.
Is it feasible to think that the First City hints at the notion of a simple soul 
that Plato entertained at some point before writing the Republic? I cannot go into 
the many details of moral psychology in early Plato here, but these issues are suf-
ficiently well-known that a quick survey should suffice. The simple soul occurs 
throughout Plato’s early work and indeed is suggested in Book I of the Republic 
(352d–353e).52 Here Socrates argues that the soul has a single function (living 
well) and a single virtue (justice), which suggests that the soul has only a single 
part (cf. 350b–c). This calls to mind the thesis of the unity of the virtues, which 
occurs frequently in early Plato (e.  g. Prt. 329d–360d, Phd. 69b–c, La.  199c–e, 
Chrm. 88b–89a).53 And as we saw above, Plato gives both epistemological and 
metaphysical arguments for thinking the soul must be simple in the Phaedo 
(78b–80e). In that work conflict occurs between the body and soul rather than 
within the soul (81b–84b, cf. Chrm. 156d–157c).54 In other words, the First Soul 
that would correspond to the First City looks very much in line with the Socratic 
depiction of the soul we see in the earlier Socratic dialogues.
This doctrinal affinity is not the only way that First City is Socratic: the life-
style of its citizens is a notably Socratic lifestyle.55 Socrates is well known for his 
52 Irwin (1995), pp. 169 and 199 also notes the connection between Book I and the earlier or 
Socratic dialogues.
53 On which see, e.  g. Devereux (2006) and Penner (1973).
54 Bobonich (2002), pp. 24–31, 217–18; Lorenz (2006a), p. 37; Price (1995), pp. 36–40; Vasiliou 
(2012), p. 26.
55 For more on this point, see Morrison (2007), pp. 252–55; Whiting (2012), 206–207.
physical moderation and hardiness, including avoiding drunkenness and fore-
going shoes (e.  g. Symp. 216d, 220a–c). He is constantly using the craftsmen as 
examples of real knowledge, even if their knowledge is limited (e.  g. Ap. 22c–e). 
Plato constantly depicts him as pious, despite Athenian accusations to the con-
trary (e.  g. Phd. 60c–61b), and as committed to the well-being of the community 
(Ap. 28d–33a, Cri. 49e–54c). The First City does not have a distinct class of poli-
ticians, against whom Socrates frequently argues (Ap. 21b–22a, Grg. 452d–455d, 
Meno 93a–95a, Prt. 319b–320b). As Klosko argues, in the Socratic dialogues 
“Socrates’s political practice amounts to a new kind of politics. Every individual 
has a rational soul, and so every individual can be awakened to become morally 
autonomous and to rule himself”.56 The closest thing we get to rule in the First 
City is governance by private citizens who are experts in their fields, the only 
group to whom Socrates attributes any kind of wisdom (Ap. 22d–e).57 Hence the 
First City reflects both theoretical and practical Socratic commitments but not 
necessarily Platonic ones.
There is one notable omission in Plato’s depiction of the First City, however: 
philosophy itself is never mentioned. If this omission indicates an absence of 
philosophy, then we might wonder how Socratic the First City really is.58 In this 
case, however, I do not believe that the omission of an explicit reference to phi-
losophy indicates an absence. Glaucon interrupts Socrates and diverts the con-
versation from the true city Socrates wanted to describe to the luxurious Second 
City Glaucon is more interested in (372e–373a). This means that the description 
of the First City we get is short and incomplete. While we cannot take for granted 
that Plato would have addressed the presence of philosophy in the First City had 
he written more about it (it was Plato’s choice as an author to create Glaucon’s 
interruption, after all), nor can we assume that a given feature would be absent 
from the First City purely on the grounds that Plato did not explicitly include it 
in the text.
Moreover, there are clues in what little description of the First City we do get 
that philosophy is present there, if only implicitly. First, recall that citizens of 
the First City engage in symposia: “reclining on beds strewn with yet and myrtle, 
they’ll feast with their children, drink their wine, and, crowned with wreaths, 
hymn the gods” (372b5–7). As we know from the dialogue Symposium, this venue 
is one place where philosophy can be practiced, and the fact that the First City 
56 Klosko (2006), p. 54.
57 Brickhouse and Smith (1994), pp. 139–41, 164–66. For the importance of technai in early Pla-
to’s ethical theory more generally, see Irwin (1977) (though see also Roochnik 1986).
58 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting the importance of this point.
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is quintessentially moderate suggests these events will not devolve into a kind of 
drinking party that would interfere with educated discussion.
Moreover, there are clues that philosophy may be present in the First City, 
despite its not being explicitly mentioned. The combination of hymns and hard 
physical labor suggests that citizens of the First City enjoy something akin to 
the psychological conditioning of the guardian-class, which is important in the 
cultivation of a philosophical soul (see especially 411e–412a). And to the extent 
that philosophy is a necessary condition for virtue, the fact that the citizens of 
the First City do seem to exhibit moderation and justice suggests that philosophy 
must be present in the city somehow, even if it is not explicitly alluded to. At the 
very least, the First City seems to be devoid of the kinds of things which might 
distract from philosophy or hinder its pursuit.59
Finally, it is worth repeating the point that many of the citizens of the First 
City have sophisticated occupations. Some inhabitants have minds that are not 
sufficient for the task (371d9–e1), to be sure, but others occupy professions that 
require mathematical knowledge, such as navigators or merchants (371a–b). The 
fact that Socrates says the luxurious ‘Second City’ will have a greater need of 
doctors “than we did before” (373d1–2) implies the presence of physicians in the 
First City, a possibility corroborated by Socrates’s claim that its inhabitants will 
live to a ripe old age (372d2–3). Even the lowlier occupations like cobbler or farmer 
involve a kind of knowledge qua craft; these are among the few groups to whom 
Socrates is willing to attribute any kind of knowledge (Ap. 22d1–2). In Athens these 
craftsmen have the flaw of overestimating their own moral knowledge, but in the 
First City citizens are more virtuous and more aware of their own limitations and 
constraints. This is shown both by the line that they will “bear no more children 
than their resources allow, lest they fall into poverty or war” (372b8–c1) and by 
the more general arrangement of a sustainable, multi-generation system where 
each person limits herself to an occupation she is good at (rather than gravitating 
toward, say, easier or more prestigious occupations).
Taking these points together, we can put the point as follows: if Socrates is 
a philosopher and the citizens of the First City live noticeably Socratic lives, it is 
reasonable to infer that the First City has a place in it for philosophy, even if it 
is not explicitly mentioned. However, this raises the question of how exactly we 
59 It is noteworthy how closely the non-philosophers of the Phaedo correspond to the luxuri-
ous Second City, on which see Bobonich (2002), pp. 21–31, 36–39. Vasiliou (2012) makes a per-
suasive case that there is a kind of real wisdom that laypeople can attain through the upbringing 
and habituation of a moderate lifestyle; this so-called “Phd-philosopher” is strikingly similar to 
citizens of the First City.
should conceive of philosophy in the first place, for Plato gives more than one 
answer to that question. In the later books of the Republic, philosophy is its own 
unique profession with its own specialized and training-intensive craft which 
only a few special people with pure souls are capable of successfully practicing. 
The First City clearly lacks this conception of philosophy, and indeed Socrates 
himself would not count as a philosopher by these criteria.60 But elsewhere in 
the Platonic corpus, we see a more pedestrian conception of how philosophy is 
practiced. In the Phaedo, for instance, philosophy is the much more mundane 
task of separating the soul from the body as much as possible by living a life that 
is not dictated by the demands of the body and by not fearing death (Phaedo 
64a–66e, 84a–b).61 And in the early Socratic dialogues, Socrates himself is the 
philosophical exemplar, whose philosophical practice is the humbler task of 
asking questions in good faith while pursuing understanding, particularly of the 
moral virtues.62
So rather than saying that philosophy is absent in the First City, we should 
conclude that there is room for a different kind of philosophy similar to that 
exemplified by Socrates in the Socratic dialogues. These conceptions are not 
wholly distinct but the differences are important. For instance, in the Republic 
knowledge of the Forms seems to require a life of philosophical training, whereas 
in the Phaedo, drawing on the Meno, knowledge of the Forms is present in even 
the lowliest uneducated slave.63 This pattern matches what we see on the topic of 
the soul: in the Republic, Plato posits a tripartite model of the soul that is different 
from what we see in the Phaedo and elsewhere, and he posits a different concep-
tion of philosophy than what we see in the Phaedo and elsewhere.64
60 Plato also describes philosophy as a love for learning in general (376b–c, 475b–e), whereas 
the Principle of Specialization in the First City suggests that each citizen only learns their own 
craft, not all of them.
61 Vasiliou (2012).
62 Something similar happens in the later sections of the Platonic Corpus. In the simple, rustic 
life of the Age of Kronos in the Statesman, the Stranger presents two options for how to use the 
leisure it provides: either (a) engage in philosophy, or (b) gorge yourself on food and gossip 
(272a–c). The First City clearly avoids the latter, which leaves the former as a live option. I am 
grateful to an anonymous referee for connecting the dots between these two passages. However, 
we should be careful to lean too heavily on this comparison since there are significant disanalo-
gies between the situations of the First City and the Age of Kronos (e.  g. no families in the latter 
and the ability to talk to animals).
63 See Dimas (2003) and Franklin (2005) for defenses of this reading of the Phaedo.
64 The easiest way to explain this disagreement is to claim that the Republic was written after 
many of these other dialogues, and in partial response to them. This is the view I prefer, though 
I cannot argue for it here (though see Mosimann 2010 and Young 1994). However, it is possible to 
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Returning to our main point, then, it is plausible to think that the reason Plato 
rejects the First City in favor of what becomes Kallipolis is because the First City 
would imply a simple soul of the sort alluded to in earlier Socratic dialogues and 
expounded in the Phaedo. This would not fit with one of the Republic’s primary 
goals of defending a tripartite soul model instead. After all, the two main projects 
of the Republic are politics and moral psychology;65 if the First City avoids the 
first issue, then the second must be the troublemaker. This hypothesis does not 
answer the more literary question of why Plato as an author would choose to con-
struct the dialogue in this way. But it does provide some explanation of why Plato 
as a philosopher would make the moves that he does.
This solution to the puzzle of the First City’s role is dependent on a number of 
assumptions about the Republic, and about the Platonic corpus more generally, 
that are not universally endorsed and which need to be defended on their own 
terms. This is, admittedly, a theoretical cost to adopting the reading of the Repub-
lic  I propose here. However, given that the other attempts to explain the First 
City’s role in the Republic do not succeed, we are compelled to look for other solu-
tions to the puzzle, even if they require us to work with a less-than-unanimous 
foundation. This is why it was important to investigate so many other attempts at 
explaining the First City’s place in the dialogue first, thereby seeing how other, 
admittedly simpler and more natural explanations do not succeed, but also to 
learn from these attempts what the criteria for a successful explanation would be. 
Though the reading defended in this paper can only be put forward as a viable 
option, it is, I submit, our best shot at explaining an otherwise mystifying feature 
of Plato’s Republic.
Conclusion
In this paper I’ve argued that we should take at face value Socrates’s praise of the 
First City as a true, complete, healthy, just city. It satisfies the definition of justice 
which Plato himself uses for Kallipolis and serves an important role in his argu-
ment for political justice. Previous attempts to explain the First City have either 
failed to appreciate that the First City really is just or have failed to account for the 
suppose that Plato is investigating different lines of thought in the Phaedo and Republic without 
presupposing any particular chronological relationship between these, or other, dialogues. All 
we need to assume is that there is a noticeably Socratic cluster of positions that Plato presents in 
different ways in the Republic compared to other works.
65 Annas (2000) passim.
First City’s role in the larger context of the Republic. If the First City is an accept-
able political arrangement, then we need some explanation of why Plato would 
both praise it and abandon it without explanation. I suggest that the answer lies 
not in political theory but in psychology. The First City implies that the soul is 
simple, and while Plato may have once entertained this model himself, by the 
time of writing the Republic he viewed it as unsatisfactory. Hence Plato goes on in 
the rest of the Republic to replace this first simple model of the soul with a more 
sophisticated, and to his mind more accurate model.66
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